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INTRODUCTION
Upon the Soviet Union's complete economic and political
failure, many speculated that Cuba would not have the financial
capability to continue its current system of government. 1 Despite
* J.D., The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law (1999); B.S.,
Florida State University (1994); law clerk to the Honorable James Lawrence King, United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida, 1999-2000.
The author would like to thank Professors William F. Fox, Antonio F. Perez,
Urban A. Lester, and Raymond C. O'Brien for their encouragement and contributions to"
this Article.
1. See Kern Alexander & Jon Mills, Resolving Property Claims in a Post-Socialist
Cuba, 27 LAW & POL'Y INT'L BUS. 137, 178-179 (1995) (stating that due to the collapse of
the Soviet Union and the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, economic growth in
Cuba declined substantially, eventually becoming stagnant). See also Serge F. Kovaleski,
Cuba Replacing Dollar with Euro to Ease Trade Woes, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1999, at A25,
A30 (noting that Cuba lost eighty-five of its economic markets and its communist satellites
in Eastern Europe when the Soviet Union collapsed, that Cuba is not a member of the
International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, and that it has trouble obtaining credit
from other sources).
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the Soviet Union's collapse, a thirty-seven year U.S. economic
embargo, and a massive internal economic crisis, Fidel Castro
continues to defy the odds and remains in control of the island.
Hence, the denial of freedom and democracy continues to plague
the Cuban people.
Located just ninety miles from the United States, Cuba is the
only communist country in the Western Hemisphere.2 In 1959,
Castro led a communist revolution that systematically and
progressively destroyed the fundamental human rights of the
people on the island. 3 Castro's nationalization of private property
without compensation to property owners was one of his more
visible attacks on human rights.4  Through a series of
expropriations, the communist regime confiscated private
residences, businesses, and lands belonging to both Cuban citizens
and foreign citizens and entities-primarily those from the United
States.5 Since taking control of the island, the Castro Government
has enacted numerous laws substantially limiting the right to own
property in Cuba.
6
How or when the "Castro era" will end is purely a matter of
speculation. It is highly unlikely that Castro will make any
substantive changes in his government or embrace democratic
ideals. 7 If post-Castro or post-socialist government authorities
wish to create a free-market democracy and ameliorate Cuba's
current economic crisis,8 they will need to negotiate a settlement
2. See Steven E. Hendrix, Tensions in Cuban Property Law, 20 HASTINGS INT'L &
COMp. L. REV. 1, 2 (1996).
3. See Nicolds J. Guti6rrez, Jr., The De-Constitutionalization of Property Rights:
Castro's Systematic Assault on Private Ownership in Cuba, 5 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 51, 53
(1997).
4. See id. at 58; see also Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 142.
5. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 142-144.
6. See id.
7. See Andres Oppenheimer, Free Four Dissidents, Europe Tells Cuba, MIAMI
HERALD, Mar. 18, 1999, at 1A (stating that, despite great criticism from the international
community, including the European Union and South America, Cuban Government
officials recently demonstrated their contempt for democratic ideals when the Cuba
Government tried, convicted, and jailed four peaceful dissidents for publishing a document
attacking Cuba's current system of government). See also Juan 0. Tamayo, Four Cuban
Dissidents Convicted: Sentences of 3 / to 5 Years Widely Condemned, MIAMI HERALD,
Mar. 16, 1999, at 1A (noting that the March 1999 convictions were the result of a new law
threatening twenty-year sentences for dissidents who support U.S. policies regarding
Cuba).
8. The average monthly salary in Cuba is about 200 pesos (ten U.S. dollars) a month;
medical doctors in Cuba earn about 300 pesos (fifteen U.S. dollars) a month; some
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with the international community, particularly with the United
States. Implementing a new democratic government is essential to
normalizing Cuba's relations with the United States.9 A new
Cuban government will have to adopt a sound and internationally
acceptable legal regime that respects and recognizes basic human
rights, including the fundamental right to own and enjoy property.
As such, this new government must prioritize the return of
confiscated property to its former owners.
The purpose of this Article is to address the Castro
Government's outrageous, unacceptable, illegal, and abusive
expropriation of property in Cuba. The Castro regime violated
the property provisions of Cuba's Constitution of 1940,10 which
were technically in place at the time the illegal takings occurred at
the start of the Castro era. In addition, Castro's regime flagrantly
violated fundamental international law principles and deprived
expropriation victims of their basic human rights. 11 In the future,
post-Castro government authorities will likely attempt to
transition to a free-market economy. Accordingly, this Article
proposes that recognizing property rights and compensating
victims of the takings, both domestic and foreign, will be crucial
early steps in Cuba's transition to democracy.
Part I analyzes the history of Castro's systematic stripping of
Cuban people's constitutional property rights and describes the
illegal takings and the laws Castro enacted to justify them. Part II
discusses Cuba's need for a legal regime based on the 1940
Constitution and internationally accepted principles of law. Part
pensions pay as little as sixty pesos (three U.S. dollars) a month. See John Rice, Cuba 40
Years After Aging Castro Has Outlived Friends, Foes, FLA. TIMES UNION (Jacksonville),
Jan. 3, 1999, at D1.
9. See generally 22 U.S.C. §§ 6021-6091 (Supp. III 1994) [hereinafter Helms-Burton
Act]. The Act does not allow the United States to engage in relations with Cuba unless
Cuba first implements a transitional democratic government. See id. § 6061(14) (asserting
that it is the policy of the United States to "take steps to remove the economic embargo of
Cuba when the President determines that a transition to a democratically elected
government in Cuba has begun.").
10. See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1940) (Cuba) [hereinafter
CUBA CONST. (1940)], translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS 610 (Amos J. Peaslee
ed. & trans., 2d ed. 1956).
11. See Edwin D. Williamson, U.S.-EU Understanding on Helms-Burton: A Missed
Opportunity to Fix International Law on Property Rights, 48 CATH. U. L. REV. 293, 306-
307 (1999) (noting that many countries' domestic laws recognize the principle that
everyone is entitled to the right to own property without arbitrary deprivation, as provided
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights).
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III addresses the need to unequivocally identify and enumerate
individual property rights within a new Cuban legal framework.
In addition, Part III proposes that the new legal framework
specifically incorporate a restitution scheme to provide redress for
the victims of illegal takings. Part IV identifies the potential
claimants in a Cuban restitution system and the laws supporting
their claims. Part V analyzes some practical issues confronting a
Cuban restitution scheme. Part VI analyzes other former
communist countries' implementation of restitution schemes.
Finally, Part VII concludes by recommending steps for a future
Cuban government to take in implementing its own restitution
system.
I. THE TAKINGS: A SYSTEMATIC DESTRUCTION OF INDIVIDUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS
A. The Roots of Property Rights in Cuba
1. The Constitution of 1901
Property rights in Cuba originated in the Constitution of
1901,12 Cuba's first constitution as a free nation, 13 which
recognized the right of an individual to own private property.
Article 32 contained the following provision: "[n]o one shall be
deprived of his property, except by competent authority, upon
proof that the condemnation is required by public utility, and
previous indemnification. If the indemnification is not previously
paid, the courts shall protect the owners and, if needed, restore to
them the property."14 This constitutional provision illustrates that
at one point in its history, the Cuban Government acknowledged
an individual's fundamental right to own and enjoy property.
12. See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1901) [hereinafter CUBA
CONST. (1901)], translated in 2 INTERNATIONAL BUREAU OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLICS,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: A COMPILATION OF THE POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONS OF
THE INDEPENDENT NATIONS OF THE NEW WORLD 112, 119 (Jose Ignacio Rodriguez
trans., 1905) [hereinafter 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS].
13. See Jonathan Wachs, Reviving the 1940 Cuban Constitution: Arguments for Social
and Economic Rights in a Post Castro Government, 10 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 525, 538
(1994). Upon gaining independence from Spain following the Spanish-American War, the
newly created Cuban Government called a constitutional assembly to draft a document
establishing the manner in which the Cuban Government would function. See id.
14. CUBA CONST. art. 32 (1901), translated in 2 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS, supra
note 12, at 119.
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Recognition of these minimum standards for government takings
is harmonious with modern international law and the current
positions most democratic countries adopt. While the provision
allows government takings, it requires a legitimate public use
justifying the takings and compensation for the property owners.
15
Unfortunately, the Constitution of 1901 was drafted during
U.S. military occupation of the island.16  Because of the
occupation, the Constitution contained the Platt Amendment,
17
which allowed the United States to intervene in Cuba's domestic
affairs in order to preserve Cuban independence. 18 The Platt
Amendment contributed to the ineffectiveness of the Constitution
of 1901 and led to its eventual failure. 19 The Constitution's
failure, however, does not diminish the fact that its framers
nevertheless recognized an individual's fundamental right to own
private property.
20
2. The Constitution of 1940
After a period of political instability following the adoption of
the Constitution of 1901, a revolution took place in Cuba.21 In
1933, Cuban revolutionaries sought a greater sense of identity and
nationalism in response to the U.S. intervention in Cuba's
domestic relations.22 Between 1933 and 1939, the United State's
15. See generally id. ("No one shall be deprived of his property, except by competent
authority, upon proof that the condemnation is required by public utility ... .
16. See Wachs, supra note 13, at 539.
17. See id. ("Because the drafting process of the 1901 Constitution occurred during
the American occupation of the island, the United States military governor effectuated the
new constitution.").
18. See CUBA CONST. app. (Platt Amendment) art. III (1901), translated in 2
AMERICAN CONsTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 153. The authority of Article 40 of the
1901 Constitution and Article III of the Platt Amendment allowed the United States and
Cuban governments to suspend constitutional rights in Cuba in the event of national
emergencies. See Wachs, supra note 13, at 539-540.
19. See JUAN M. DEL AGUILA, CUBA: DILEMMAS OF A REVOLUTION 18-19 (2d ed.
1988). Del Aguila suggests that U.S. occupation of Cuba limited Cuba's "ability to exert
political control over its inhabitants" and notes that the frequent invocation of Article 40's
"emergency situations" made the Cuban people question "the significance of their
constitutional rights." Wachs, supra note 14, at 540 & nn.79, 81 (referring to DEL AGUILA,
supra, at 18). The Cuban people simply did not believe that the Constitution of 1901 was
the true law of the land. See id. at 539-540.
20. See Wachs, supra note 14, at 538 (discussing the 1901 constitutional draft, which
contained "several liberal provisions designed to protect the economic rights of domestic
and foreign entities.").
21. See id. at 541-542.
22. See id.
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involvement in Cuba's internal affairs diminished.23 In 1939, the
Cuban people elected delegates for a constitutional assembly to
draft a new constitution and bring about the end of the Platt
Amendment.
24
Many Cubans consider the adoption of the Constitution of
1940 a defining moment in Cuba's history.25  Unlike the
Constitution of 1901, the Constitution of 1940 symbolized Cuban
sovereignty and gave the Cuban people a great sense of national
pride, which had been significantly diminished during the U.S.
occupations. 26 The Constitution of 1940 guaranteed all Cuban
citizens extensive social and economic rights, including substantial
property rights.
27
Two of the Constitution of 1940's significant property
provisions are Articles 2428 and 87.29 Article 24 reads as follows:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. No one can be deprived
of his property by competent judicial authority and for a
justified cause of public utility or social, and always after
payment of the corresponding indemnity in cash, judicially
fixed. No-compliance [sic] with these requisites shall determine
the right of the person whose property has been expropriated,
to be protected by the courts, and, if the case calls for it, to have
his property restored to him.
30
Article 87 provides that: "The Cuban Nation recognizes the
existence and legitimacy of private property in its broadest
concept as a social function and without other limitations than
those which, for reasons of public necessity or social interest, are
established by law."
31
These provisions guaranteed the right to own and use
23. See id.
24. See id. at 542-543.
25. See id. at 544.
26. See id.
27. See CUBA CONST. arts. 10, 24 (1940), translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS,
supra note 10, at 611, 614. See also Wachs, supra note 13, at 543 (discussing the 1940
Constitution's social and economic guarantees); Matias F. Travieso-Diaz, Alternative
Remedies in a Negotiated Settlement of the U.S. Nationals' Expropriation Claims Against
Cuba, 17 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 659,666 (1996) (commenting on the 1940 Constitution's
property provisions).
28. CUBA CONST. art. 24 (1940), translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra
note 10, at 614.
29. Id. art. 87, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra note 10, at 626.
30. Id. art. 24, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra note 10, at 614.
31. Id. art. 87, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra note 10, at 626.
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property without government interference. Article 87 established
a standard of "public necessity" or "social interest" to justify
government takings.32 Article 24 required cash indemnification to
property owners for government takings, as well as judicial
protection in cases involving governmental non-compliance.
33
Like the property provisions in the Constitution of 1901, these
guarantees are perfectly acceptable under international laws and
are consistent with democratic legal principles.
34
B. The Destruction of Constitutional Property Rights in Cuba
1. The Constitutional Act of 1952
Property rights in Cuba began deteriorating in 1952 when
Fulgencio Batista led a military coup d'etat.35 Upon gaining
control of the island, Batista issued the Constitutional Act of
1952,36 which repealed the Constitution of 1940.37 Substantively,
the Constitutional Act of 1952 was virtually identical to the
Constitution of 1940. Under this Act, however, only members of
the Council of Ministers appointed by Batista could make
amendments. 38 This was clearly contrary to the amendment
procedures in Articles 285 and 286 of the Constitution of 1940 and
essentially made Batista the dictator of Cuba.39 Batista's Council
of Ministers never reinstated the Constitution of 1940's property
protections. 40 Thus, private property became unprotected under
Cuban law. Batista's actions, coupled with the Cuban people's
inability to deflect Batista's constitutional violations, established
32. See id.
33. Id. art. 24, translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra note 10, at 614.
34. See generally Wachs, supra note 13, at 543 ("In several of the [1940
Constitution's] provisions, the document raises to constitutional status rights that other
countries provide only by statute.").
35. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 147-148.
36. Constitutional Act of 1952, Gaceta Oficial, Special Ed. (Apr. 4, 1952) (Cuba),
translated in part in INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, CUBA AND THE RULE OF
LAW 83 & n.1 (1962). "Gaceta Oficial is the Cuban analog to the U.S. Congressional
Record." Sanchez, supra note 39, at 140.
37. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 147.
38. See id. at 147-148.
39. See id. at 148. See also CUBA CONST. arts. 285-286 (1940), translated in I
CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra note 10, at 668. Articles 285 and 286 required that
the elected Congress amend the Constitution. See Ignacio E. SAnchez, Cuban Property
Rights and the 1940 Constitution, 3 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 135, 142 (1994).
40. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 148.
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the dangerous precedent of ignoring the important procedural
mechanisms in the Cuban Constitution.41
2. Castro's Revolution and First Attack on Property Rights
Fidel Castro used Batista's disregard for the Constitution of
1940 to justify his own revolution. 42 Castro seized control of the
island on January 1, 1959 and promised to re-enact the
Constitution of 1940.4 3 In the early days of Castro's revolution,
the Constitution of 1940 was re-enacted; 44 however, Castro later
appointed a Council of Ministers who, like Batista's Council,
usurped the Constitution of 1940's amending procedures. 45 One
of the Council's first amendments to the Constitution of 1940
involved a revision to the property provisions in Article 24.46 The
revised text of Article 24 reads as follows:
Confiscation of property is prohibited. However, confiscation is
authorized in the case of property of natural persons or
corporate bodies liable for offenses against the national
economy or the public treasury committed during the tyranny
which ended on December 31, 1958, as well as in the case of
property of the tyrant and his collaborators. No one can be
deprived of property except by competent judicial authority and
for a justified cause of public utility or social interest, and
always after payment of the corresponding indemnity in cash, as
fixed by a court.
47
This amendment to Article 24, which was procedurally illegal
under the 1940 Constitution's amending procedures, signified
Castro's first attack on Cuban property rights.48 This revision not
only allowed discriminatory takings of property from any of
Batista's followers, but also worked as a mechanism to punish all
political opposition. This early revision of Article 24 set the stage
for the systematic destruction of property rights in Cuba.
41. See Sdnchez, supra note 39, at 144.
42. See id. at 142-144; see also Wachs, supra note 13, at 545-546.
43. See Sinchez, supra note 39, at 143.
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 143-144.
48. See id.
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3. The Fundamental Law of 1959
Castro's initial confiscation plan continued until February 7,
1959, when he officially repealed the Constitution of 1940 and
enacted the Fundamental Law of 1959.49 The Fundamental Law
officially proclaimed Castro's Council of Ministers as the supreme
lawmaking body of Cuba.50 This law, allegedly only "temporarily"
effective until Castro's government drafted a new constitution
consistent with the communist revolution's goals, 51 revised Article
24 to officially punish Batista and his followers.
52
C. Gross Violations of Accepted Property Rights
1. The Agrarian Reform Act
The Agrarian Reform Act (ARA),53 enacted on June 3, 1959,
constituted one of the many amendments to the Fundamental
Law.54 The Act represented the Castro Government's first gross
violation of sound, individual property rights.
The ARA converted agricultural estates into state-owned
farms. 55 All privately owned land exceeding five caballerias
56
qualified for nationalization under the ARA.57 The government
essentially forced qualifying private landowners to sell their land
for a price the government deemed appropriate. 58  The
49. See Sinchez, supra note 39, at 144. See also Fundamental Law of Cuba (Feb. 7,
1959) (Cuba) [hereinafter Fundamental Law], translated in IV CONSTITUTIONS OF
NATIONS 367 (Amos J. Peaslee ed. & trans., rev. 3d ed. 1970) [hereinafter IV
CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS].
50. See SAnchez, supra note 39, at 144. See also Fundamental Law art. 119, translated
in IV CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra note 49, at 391.
51. See generally Gutidrrez, supra note 3, at 54. The law was hardly temporary. See
id. at 54, 61. Between February 7, 1959 and August 23, 1961, the Council of Ministers
amended the Fundamental Law sixteen times. See Sinchez, supra note 39, at 144. The
Fundamental Law and its subsequent amendments, designed to "strengthen state control
and reduce individual political rights," basically served as Cuba's constitution for
seventeen years, until 1976, when a new communist constitution was enacted. Wachs,
supra note 13, at 546.
52. See Snchez, supra note 39, at 144.
53. Ley de Reforma Agraria [Agrarian Reform Act], Gaceta Oficial, Special Ed., No.
7 (June 3, 1959) (Cuba).
54. See Sdnchez, supra note 39, at 144.
55. See id.
56. See Gutidrrez, supra note 3, at 55 n.14 (explaining that one caballeria is equivalent
to thirty-three acres).
57. See id. at 55.
58. See id.
329
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government placed significant restrictions on the lands of those
individuals permitted to keep their property, including: (1)
outlawing sale of the property without state authorization; (2)
restricting use of the land; (3) forcing owners to sell produce from
any harvest to the state at prices fixed by the state; (4) restricting
property transfers, including the state's reserved right of first
refusal; and (5) placing burdensome restrictions on the inheritance
of property.59 The ARA represented an extreme violation of the
Constitution of 1940's property provisions, which were technically
effective at the time these takings occurred. Additionally, the
ARA differed significantly from generally accepted property law
principles that do not allow government takings without a
legitimate purpose and proper compensation. 60
2. Further Changes to Article 24
On November 22, 1959, the Castro Government amended
Article 24 to permit expropriation of property from additional
classes of persons. 61 These classes included: (1) persons found
guilty of offenses the law defined as counter-revolutionary; (2)
persons leaving the national territory in any manner whatsoever
thereby evading the jurisdiction of the revolutionary courts; and
(3) persons who, having left the national territory, performed
conspiratorial acts against the revolutionary government. 62 In
effect, this revision provided for confiscation of property
belonging to anyone who opposed Castro and punishment of
those who fled the country. Additionally, the Castro Government
failed to provide a legitimate public purpose for the takings or
compensate people who were deprived of their property.
Furthermore, from a technical standpoint, Castro lacked the
authority to carry out the governmental takings.63
59. See id. at 56.
60. See id. at 55.
61. See Sdnchez, supra note 40, at 145.
62. See Gutidrrez, supra note 3, at 57.
63. See id. at 57-58.
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3. Changing the Original Text of Article 24
The original text of Article 24 was changed again on July 5,
1960 to read as follows:
[N]o other natural or juridical person can be deprived of his
property except by competent authority and for a justifiable
cause of public utility or social or national interest. The law
shall regulate the procedure for expropriation and shall
establish legislation and forms of payment and shall determine
the competent authority to declare the case to be of public
utility or social or national interest and that the expropriation is
necessary.
64
The first critical change to the text was the replacement of the
"competent judicial authority" language in the Constitution of
1940 and the Fundamental Law of 1959 with "competent
authority." 65 Removing the word "judicial" eliminated the judicial
presence requirement for issues regarding the expropriation of
property, which, in turn, also eliminated the safety that judicial
inspection provides. Essentially, "competent authority" referred
to Castro and his Council of Ministers, who the new law allowed
to expropriate property based on "public utility or social or
national interest. '66 In other words, the law allowed Castro to
confiscate property for whatever reason, whenever and from
whomever he wanted, completely free from judicial scrutiny.67
The second crucial change to Article 24 eliminated the
requirement of "indemnity in cash" with regard to compensation
from the government for takings.68 The new text, which provided
that "the law shall regulate the procedure for expropriation and
shall establish legislation and forms of payment, 69 deprived
victims of any defined judicial procedure to challenge the
expropriation.
As a further deviation from the Constitution of 1940 property
provisions, on January 24, 1961, the category of property subject
to expropriation was expanded to encompass "those [cases]
deemed necessary by the Government in order to prevent acts of
64. Id. at 57 (alteration in original).
65. See Sinchez, supra note 40, at 146.
66. Guti6rrez, supra note 3, at 58.
67. See id. at 56.
68. See Sinchez, supra note 40, at 146.
69. Guti6rrez, supra note 3, at 57.
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sabotage, terrorism or any other counter-revolutionary
activities." 70 Again, the purpose of this change was to eliminate
all political opposition to Castro's regime.
4. Law No. 851 and Law No. 890
In July 1960, in order to punish the U.S. Government's
growing criticism of and opposition to Castro's regime, Castro
enacted Law No. 851,71 which forcibly expropriated all businesses
U.S. citizens owned in Cuba.72  The law provided that
compensation for these takings would be determined at a later
date.
73
Soon after the enactment of Law No. 851, Castro's
Government passed Law No. 890,74 which confiscated virtually all
Cuban-owned businesses 75 and nationalized all Cuban-owned
industries. 76 Similar to Law No. 851, Law No. 890 vaguely
referenced compensation, which, as history sadly demonstrated,
never materialized.
77
D. The Current Status of Property in Cuba
1. The Constitution of 1976
On February 24, 1976, the Castro regime enacted the
Constitution of 1976, which manifests the goals of the communist
revolution in Cuba.78  For instance, Article 14 calls for an
70. Id. at 58.
71. See id. at 59 & n.30. See also Ley Numero 851 [Law No. 851], Gaceta Oficial,
Special Ed., No. 22 (July 31, 1960) (Cuba).
72. See Guti6rrez, supra note 3, at 59.
73. See id.
74. See Ley Numero 890 [Law No. 890], Gaceta Oficial, Special Ed., No. 25 (Oct. 31,
1960) (Cuba).
75. See Gutirrez, supra note 3, at 59.
76. See id. The businesses confiscated under Law No. 890 included:
sugar mills, distilleries, alcoholic beverage plants, detergent factories,
perfumeries, dairy producers, confectioners, wheat mills, container makers, paint
producers, chemical companies, paper companies, metallurgists, lamp makers,
textile industries, rice mills, food producers, edible oil producers, whole sale food
distribution warehouses, coffee mills, pharmaceutical industries, department
stores, railroad companies, printers, cinematographers, construction companies,
electric utilities and maritime industries ....
Id.
77. See id.
78. See CONSTITUCION DE LA REPUBLICA DE CUBA (1976) [hereinafter CUBA
CONST. (1976)], translated in V CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD 1
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economic system based upon the "people's socialist ownership of
the means of production and on the abolition of the exploitation
of man by man" in the Republic of Cuba. 79 Furthermore, Chapter
I, Article 15, defines "property" in the following manner:
The socialist state property, which is the property of the entire
people, becomes irreversibly established over the lands that do
not belong to small farmers or to cooperatives formed by the
same; over the subsoil, mines, the natural resources and flora
and fauna in the marine area over which it has jurisdiction,
woods, waters, means of communication; over the sugar mills,
factories, chief means of transportation; and over all those
enterprises, banks, installations and properties that have been
nationalized and expropriated from the imperialists, the
landholders and the bourgeoisie; as well as over the people's
farms, factories, enterprises and economic and social, cultural
and sport facilities built, fostered or purchased by the state and
those that will be built, fostered or purchased by the state in the
future.
80
This language put the final touch on Castro's confiscation scheme.
It placed virtually all land and industry in the Castro
Government's hands and stripped all private property ownership
of constitutional protection. 81 Furthermore, the Constitution of
1976 makes no reference to compensating the individuals whose
property was seized.
2. The 1992 Amendments
In an effort to alleviate damages resulting from the Soviet
Union's fall and the consequential decrease in subsidies, further
amendments were made to the Constitution of 1976.82 Such
amendments allowed foreign entities to assume partial ownership
of certain Cuban industries such as tourism, mining,
communications, real estate, petroleum, manufacturing, sugar, and
construction. 83 In addition to the Cuban Government owning
(Albert P. Blaustein & Gisbert H. Flanz eds., 1996). See also Guti~rrez, supra note 3, at
60-61.
79. CUBA CONST. ch. 1, art. 14 (1976), translated in V CONSTITUTIONS OF THE
COUNTRIES OF THE WORLD, supra note 78, at 9 (alteration in original).
80. Id. ch. 1, art. 15, translated in V CONSTITUTIONS OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE
WORLD, supra note 78, at 9 (alteration in original).
81. See Wachs, supra note 13, at 550.
82. See Gutidrrez, supra note 3, at 62-63.
83. See id.
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illegally expropriated property, foreign entities now acquired
equity in confiscated property.84  This development makes
determining ownership of property in a post-socialist Cuba
difficult and troublesome. The fight for property in a post-Castro
Cuba will take on heated legal, political, moral, and economic
dimensions.
II. THE NEED FOR A NEW LEGAL REGIME BASED ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF 1940 AND INTERNATIONALLY ACCEPTED
PRINCIPLES OF LAW
The manner in which the Castro regime stripped Cuban
citizens and foreign nationals in Cuba of constitutional property
rights will be the primary source of discussion and controversy in
negotiated settlements between a post-socialist Cuba and the
international community. 85 If post-socialist Cuban government
authorities wish to take part in the global economy, they will need
to implement a governmental and legal framework based on a new
democratic constitution. Furthermore, government authorities
must make resolving Cuba's property dilemma a priority.
86
To develop a free-market economy, Cuba needs the United
States as a trading partner. In return, the United States will likely
demand a role in structuring the new Cuban government and legal
system. The United States, however, should merely assist the
Cuban people in this undertaking because the drafting of a new
constitution must be left primarily to the Cuban people.
The framers of a new Cuban constitution must take bold
initiative. They must invalidate many of the laws Castro enacted,
including a majority of the property laws. Political critics will
likely denounce the invalidation of Castro's property laws as
unrealistic and impractical. Cuba's current laws, however, are so
far removed from modern, moral, and sound legal principles, that
no room exists for any of Castro's laws or policies in a future
democratic government. The new constitution must incorporate
the world's great democratic nations' ideals and consider the
political, economic, and social conditions in post-socialist Cuba.
84. See Williamson, supra note 11, at 293-294. The Helms-Burton Act establishes a
cause of action, in U.S. Federal Courts, against any entity who takes an ownership interest
or "trafficks" in confiscated property. See id. See also 22 U.S.C. § 6091(a) (Supp. III
1994).
85. See Williamson, supra note 11, at 312-313.
86. See id.
[Vol. 22:321
2000] Takings and Restitution Schemes in Post-Socialist Cuba 335
The Constitution of 1940 should serve as the basis for
drafting the new constitution. Even if none of the specific 1940
provisions are used and an entirely new constitution is drafted, the
new constitution's framers should acknowledge the Constitution
of 1940's existence and authority.87  Such acknowledgement
indicates that Castro's disregard for the Constitution of 1940 via
his illegal, immoral, and intolerable actions destroyed a
democracy. In the interest of creating respect for and continuity
of law,88 development of any new legal framework should include
recognition of the Constitution of 1940.
III. ADDRESSING THE PROPERTY DILEMMA WITHIN THE NEW
LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. Using the Constitution of 1940's Property Provisions
The rights and laws implemented by the Constitution of 1940
are still fundamentally sound. Thus, drafting an entirely new
document is unnecessary. 89 Because the Constitution of 1940's
property provisions adhere to international standards, only minor
changes are actually necessary in drafting new property laws. 90
Any weaknesses in the Constitution of 1940 are curable via the
use of the basic, universally accepted property law principles
adopted in most democratic nations' constitutions. Additionally,
because the Constitution of 1940 was technically operating at the
time the takings occurred, 91 it should serve as legal precedent in
assessing domestic and foreign property claims. Using the 1940
property provisions, subject to minor amendments, is a viable and
prudent solution for settling takings claims.
87. See Wachs, supra note 13, at 568.
88. See, e.g., Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 151 (noting that Poland included pre-
1939 laws in its post-communist compensation scheme and that the policy of doing so
derives from a legal tradition respecting the concept of continuity of law).
89. See Nicolis J. Guti6rrez, Jr., Righting Old Wrongs: A Survey of Restitution
'Schemes for Possible Application to a Democratic Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L L. 111, 146
(1995) (noting that the Constitution of 1940 is an internationally accepted model for new
Iberian and Latin American democracies).
90. See CUBA CONST. art. 7 (1940), translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS,
supra note 10, at 611.
91. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 151-153.
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B. Implementing a Restitution Scheme
As a consequence of Cuba's current archaic property laws,
changes more substantial than simple reinstatement of the 1940
provisions may be necessary if the ultimate settlement of property
claims in Cuba is the desired objective. For example, the framers
of any new Cuban laws will have to formally declare that the
Castro takings were illegal and the victims are entitled to
restitution and/or compensation. The new legal framework must
include a restitution scheme encouraging U.S. and foreign
investment. Such investment is crucial in Cuba's transition to a
market-based economy and democracy. 92 Wealthy Cuban exiles
and multitudes of U.S. and foreign corporations relish the idea of
tapping into the Cuban economic market, which has remained
virtually dormant since the enactment of the Fundamental Law of
1959.
Domestically, the Cuban treasury is drained, Cuba's citizens'
resources are nominal, and the Cuban Government is on the verge
of insolvency. 93  Without foreign investment, it would be
extremely difficult for Cuba to develop a market-based
economy, 94 and without a market-based economy, establishing a
democracy will be virtually impossible. 95  Therefore, the
importance of implementing restitution and/or compensation
schemes cannot be overstated.
IV. IDENTIFYING THE POSSIBLE CLAIMANTS AND APPLYING THE
CORRESPONDING TAKINGS LAW
There will be three primary classes of claimants vying for
positions in a Cuban restitution system: (1) Cuban nationals and
exiles; (2) U.S. corporations and individuals; and (3) foreign
companies currently possessing ownership interests in
expropriated property. An illegal expropriation restitution
scheme must first identify which takings laws apply to which
claimants. The next step is determining whether the
expropriations by Castro's Government violated those laws.
92. See Robert E. Freer, Jr., The Significance of Restitution in the Economic Recovery
of Cuba, 4 U. MIAMI Y.B. INT'L LAW. 185, 187-189 (1995).
93. See id. at 187.
94. See id.
95. See id.
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A. For All Eligible Claimants: A Human Rights Violation
First and foremost, it must be noted that Castro's takings
violated all of the eligible claimants' human rights. Every human
being enjoys the right to own property and the right not to be
arbitrarily deprived thereof.96 This principle is set forth in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recognized in many
countries' domestic laws.
97
B. For Cuban Nationals and Cuban Exiles: Violations of Articles
24 and 87 of the Constitution of 1940
For Cuban citizens, the Castro Government's takings violated
Articles 24 and 87 of the Constitution of 1940. The Constitution
of 1940 allowed government takings only for legitimate public
purposes and only if the property owners are compensated.
98
Castro's takings were illegal in that they neither served a
legitimate state interest nor contemplated compensating the
original owners. It is arguable, however, that the takings served a
legitimate state interest in that they advanced Castro's socialist
state; but the requirement of just compensation was not satisfied,
and the takings were therefore illegal.
Furthermore, the takings were also illegal under the
Fundamental Law of 1959, a law Castro himself enacted.99 Castro
attempted to legalize the takings by amending the Constitution of
1940 to reflect the changing nature of Cuban welfare. 100 Any
changes to the Constitution of 1940, however, violated Articles
285 and 286, which required that the Cuban legislature amend any
Constitutional provisions.10 1  The takings not only flagrantly
violated the Constitution of 1940, but they were also based on
invalid amendments.
96. See Williamson, supra note 11, at 306.
97. See id. at 306-307.
98. CUBA CONST. arts. 24, 87 (1940), translated in I CONSTrIUTIONS OF NATIONS,
supra note 10, at 614, 626.
99. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 154.
100. See id. at 152-153.
101. See id. at 152.
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Social Considerations
The Cuban citizens presently living in Cuba have virtually no
economic power. Most property claims involve attempts to secure
ownership of their homes. A small percentage of Cuban
nationals, however, may also have takings claims for the
expropriation of small businesses. Compared to the Cuban
nationals in Cuba, however, the Cuban exile community possesses
tremendous financial and political power. The relationship
between nationals and exiles will significantly affect the early
stages of Cuba's transition to democracy. Tension between the
two groups could cause civil unrest, stalling the democratic
process. Cuban exiles must realize that, although they suffered
great losses in leaving Cuba, the Cubans who remain on the island
endure the hardships accompanying life in a freedom-less society.
It is further notable to this discussion that although many exiles
took citizenship in other countries, they, or their descendents,
were Cuban nationals at the time the takings occurred, and thus
should also be entitled to restitution.
10 2
C. U.S. Citizens and Corporations: Violations of International Law
At the time the taking of U.S. properties occurred, Cuba was
a member of the United Nations. 10 3 Thus, it is appropriate to
analyze the taking of U.S. property in Cuba in accordance with
international law-more specifically, the United Nations' view on
government takings of foreign-owned property. Furthermore, in
accordance with the Constitution of 1940, "[t]he Cuban Nation
adopts the principles and practices of international law that favor
human solidarity, respect for the sovereignty of peoples,
reciprocity between nations, and universal peace and
civilization.' 1
04
102. See Frances H. Foster, Restitution of Expropriated Property: Post Soviet Lessons
for Cuba, 34 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 621, 656 (1996). Under the Estonian and Latvian
restitution schemes, if a claimant (who is now a citizen in another country) was a national
at the time the takings occurred, the claimant is treated the same as are current citizens,
for purposes of the claim. See id.
103. See United Nations Member States (visited Feb. 22, 2000)
<http://www.un.org/Overview/unmember.html> (listing Cuba's date of admission to the
United Nations as October 24, 1945).
104. CUBA CONST. art. 7 (1940), translated in I CONSTITUTIONS OF NATIONS, supra
note 10, at 611.
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In 1974, the United Nations adopted Resolution 3281 of the
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States. 10 5 Article 2.2(c)
of Resolution 3281 provides that each state has the right:
[to] nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign
property, in which case appropriate compensation should be
paid by the State adopting such measures, taking into account
its relevant laws and regulations and all circumstances that the
State considers pertinent. In any case where the question of
compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled
under the domestic law of the nationalizing State and by its
tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually agreed by all States
concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis of
sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the
principle of free choice of means.
106
Cuba could argue that its domestic laws do not require full
compensation; thus, its actions do not conflict with the current
U.N. position. This argument is problematic because Cuba has
neither provided nor contemplated providing any compensation to
U.S. citizens and corporations. 10 7 Thus, according to the U.N., the
Cuban takings are clearly illegal.
Together, U.S. corporations' and citizens' claims against
Cuba exceed 1.6 billion dollars.10 8  Some argue that Cuban
nationals' claims should take priority over U.S. claims. Such an
argument is unwise, however, because the law should treat all
claimants equally. Furthermore, because U.S. investment is
critical to the future of Cuba's economy, U.S. claimants must
receive compensation for the illegal takings.
10 9
105. See U.N. CHARTER OF ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND DUTIES OF STATES, U.N.
GAOR, 29th Sess., 3211th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 12, at 2, U.N. Doc. AIRES/3281
(XXIX) (1975).
106. See id. ch. II, art. 2(2)(c), at 5; see also Thomas J. Lang, Satisfaction of Claims
Against Vietnam for the Expropriation of U.S. Citizens' Property in South Vietnam in 1975,
28 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 265, 279 (1995) (noting that the language in Resolution 3281
requires that the domestic court of the confiscating state determine compensation).
107. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 145.
108. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 27, app. A at 684; see also Matias F. Travieso-Diaz,
Some Legal and Practical Issues in the Resolution of Cuban Nationals' Claims Against
Cuba, 16 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 217,220 (1995).
109. See generally Travieso-Diaz, supra note 108, at 221 (noting that "[t]here are ...
reasons why the early resolution of this issue is urgent: (1) U.S. laws require resolution of
U.S. citizen expropriation claims before foreign aid can resume... ").
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D. Foreign Companies with Proprietary Interests in Confiscated
Property
Foreign companies that obtained equity in confiscated
property should not have valid claims in, and should be excluded
from, any restitution scheme. 110  Absent compensation, an
expropriating country cannot transfer legally valid title to third-
party purchasers. 111 "[TIhere can never be a secure right to
private property if a thief can pass good title."112  Although a
sovereign state may rightfully expropriate property with just cause
and fair compensation, 113  absence of either requirement
constitutes theft and negates the notion of enforceable rights to
property.
Foreign company claimants could argue that they acquired
partial ownership of the confiscated property in good faith. The
fact that "it was worldwide knowledge that the [Castro] regime
was confiscating private property without compensation, '" 114
however, may significantly weaken this argument. "[T]hird-party
purchasers of the nationalized property sold by Castro, 'knowing
that the property was confiscated without payment to the rightful
owner,' are trafficking in stolen goods . . .and are engaging in
illicit commercial activity even under a mainstream civil law
analysis." 115  Categorizing third-party investors that unlawfully
acquired land from Castro as claimants deserving of restitution
undermines the democratic process in Cuba, and therefore must
be invalidated.
110. "For example, the Inter-America Judicial Committee's opinion on Helms-Burton
(sadly joined in by the U.S. member) implicitly held that a confiscating state can pass good
title to the confiscated property ...." Williamson, supra note 11, at 294. The Committee
also held that "international law does not recognize any right by the former property
owner to assert a claim against the confiscating state, and that the former property owner's
claim can only be asserted through an espousal by his or her state." Id. Furthermore, the
former property owner must have been a national of the espousing state at all times-from
the time the expropriation occurred to the time he or she asserted the claim-and cannot
have been a national of the confiscating state at the time the confiscation occurred. See id.
According to Williamson, if this view is the correct one, then a change in customary
international law governing confiscation is necessary. See id.
111. See Craig R. Giesze, Helms-Burton in Light of the Common Law Legal Traditions:
Is Legal Analysis Alone Sufficient to Settle Controversies Arising Under International Law
on the Eve of the Second Summit of the Americas?, 32 INT'L LAW. 51, 82-83 (1998).
112. Id. at 83.
113. See id. at 82.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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V. PRACTICAL LEGAL MATTERS ARISING IN A RESTITUTION
SCHEME
In light of the problems facing present-day Cuba, clearly, a
new legal scheme identifying property rights, declaring Castro's
takings illegal, and utilizing a restitution scheme should be
implemented. The challenge of drafting sound property laws and
declaring Castro's expropriations illegal, however, are minor
compared to the tasks involved with implementing a successful
restitution scheme. The successful application of such a scheme
requires a fair and unambiguous system with well-defined rules,
standards, and procedures.11 6  In addition to the legal issues
presented in this Article, a variety of other practical, legal, and
administrative matters arise in the restitution schemes that other
former communist countries employ.
A. Establishing Agencies and Procedures
A governmental body designed to handle expropriation
claims is necessary for creating a restitution scheme.
1 7 Most
restitution schemes establish government agencies, commissions,
or committees n 8 with legal authority over the settlement of
claims.119 These governmental bodies may exist at either local or
national levels. 120 Some schemes create appellate divisions within
the governmental bodies. 121 Other schemes provide for appellate
review through the courts. 122 A scheme may also involve different
governmental bodies created to handle domestic and foreign
claims.
A successful restitution scheme requires well-defined
procedures, such as enforcing strict deadlines for filing claims,
implementing clear rules establishing claimants' eligibility, and
applying fixed evidentiary standards of proof.123 Establishing
well-defined procedures and agencies to implement them is crucial
to avoid confusion and controversy in the restitution process.
116. See Foster, supra note 102, at 656.
117. See generally id. at 633-645 (discussing forms of restitution).
118. See id.
119. See id.
120. See id.
121. See id.
122. See id.
123. See id. at 656.
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B. Treatment of Claimants
After ascertaining the applicable law, it is necessary for a new
Cuban government to understand how restitution schemes apply
to different types of claimants. Many schemes treat domestic and
foreign claimants separately; others establish priority hierarchies
of claimants. Several schemes exclude certain types of claimants
from receiving certain types of property and some exclude certain
types of claimants from recovery altogether. Still other schemes
do not allow restitution of any kind, unless the claimant currently
resides within the country or intends to return thereto. With many
of these schemes, issues arise as to whether claimants who were
nationals at the time the taking occurred, but have since become
citizens of other countries, deserve the same restitution as current
nationals.
C. Physical Restitution or Compensation?
One of the primary purposes in creating a restitution scheme
is to provide claimants with either restitution or compensation, or
both. There are two types of restitution: natural and
substitutional. Natural restitution involves returning confiscated
property to the original owners. 124  Substitutional restitution
provides former owners with replacement property equivalent in
value to the stolen property. 12
5
Compensation entails providing victims with financial
restitution for the value of the confiscated property rather than
literally returning the property. 126 Compensation usually comes in
the form of lump-sum cash payments or interests in government
securities. 127 Some compensation schemes account for accrued
interest and increases or decreases in property values in estimating
the value of claims128-other schemes ignore such valuations.
A problem common to all restitution schemes involves the
fact that confiscated property is often destroyed, lost, or
irreversibly converted to state use. 129 In such instances, returning
the property to its former owners is impossible. Therefore, some
124. See id. at 633.
125. See id. at 635.
126. See id.
127. See id. at 635-636.
128. See id. at 636.
129. See Gutidrrez, supra note 89, at 115.
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property is intentionally excluded from restitution schemes
because of "state needs,"'130 and former owners are only eligible
for compensation.
131
Housing often presents problems with restitution schemes.
Many restitution schemes do not remove families from their
current homes before returning the property to the former
owners. In such cases, some restitution schemes allow current
tenants to buy the property. 132 As a result, the former owners are
again only eligible for compensation.
133
D. Categorizing Property
Restitution schemes often exclude certain types of property
from restitution and only provide former owners with
compensation. Restitution systems categorize and define property
in different ways. 134 Whereas one scheme limits the definition of
property to industrial buildings, housing, and agricultural lands,
another classifies securities, machinery, and valuables as property
eligible for a claimant's restitution and/or compensation.
135
Another issue arising in categorizing property is whether
restrictions on a former owner's use of the re-acquired property
are necessary. Examples of such limitations include limiting the
amount of land a former owner may re-acquire 136 and restricting
the use of the returned property by requiring that the former
owner use it exclusively for state-related needs.
137
E. Evidentiary Matters
Under any scheme, a claimant seeking restitution for
expropriated property usually must provide evidence of
ownership. In most former communist countries, records of
original ownership are difficult to obtain.138  Thus, proving
ownership may represent a significant hurdle for many claimants.
130. See Foster, supra note 102, at 633.
131. See id.
132. See id.
133. See id.
134. See Guti6rrez, supra note 89, at 116-117.
135. See id. at 116.
136. See Foster, supra note 102, at 634.
137. See id. at 633.
138. See id. at 643; see also Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 186.
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F. Insufficient Natural and Financial Resources
A major concern under any restitution scheme is the
availability of natural (e.g., land) and financial resources to satisfy
claims. Cuba and its government are currently in financial
turmoil.139 Clearly, if a restitution system is implemented, Cuba
will lack the natural and financial resources necessary to satisfy a
majority of the expropriation claims for restitution. Other
countries facing such a dilemma create special compensation funds
to raise money to satisfy restitution claims;140 issue government
securities when cash is unavailable; require claimants choose
between restitution and compensation to reduce government
liability; and privatize large state assets and use the funds to satisfy
compensation claims.
141
VI. LESSONS LEARNED FROM FORMER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES
Fortunately, Cuba will have some guidance in addressing
some of the practical issues involved in the application of a
restitution scheme. 142 Several former communist countries in
Central and Eastern Europe implemented massive restitution
schemes in the wake of their failed communist governments.
143
A. The Baltic Republics (Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia)
The Baltic Republics (Baltics) adhere to the principle that
confiscated property should be returned to the former owner.144
Baltic Government authorities also believe that their citizens are
entitled to resume their lives as they were prior to the communist
takeover.
145
Estonian legislation calls for the State Property Department
to create a special commission to handle claims and provide
judicially guaranteed restitution or compensation to expropriation
claimants. 146  The Latvian and Lithuanian schemes take a
139. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 137, 178-179.
140. See Foster, supra note 102, at 636.
141. See id.
142. See generally Gutidrrez, supra note 89 (discussing restitution schemes
implemented in several former communist countries, including the Baltic Republics,
Bulgaria, Romania, East Germany, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic).
143. See id.
144. See id. at 114.
145. See id. at 115.
146. See Foster, supra note 102, at 639 & n.96, 627 n.20 (citing the Law of the Republic
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different approach.147 For example, the provisions of the Latvian
scheme regarding restitution of buildings assign the responsibility
of reviewing claims to commissions that municipal or regional
deputies' councils create. 148 Final decision-making responsibility
resides with executive committees that local deputies' councils
create. 149 The Latvian scheme also allows claimants to appeal to
the Council of Ministers' Property Conversion Department or to
the Latvian courts.
150
The Lithuanian scheme, in contrast, allocates claims to
different bodies for evaluation according to the type of property at
issue.151 For example, a government-created ministry evaluates
claims involving forests and land,152 municipal or regional bodies
evaluate claims for residential and commercial buildings, 153 and
Lithuanian courts handle only appeals of administrative
decisions. 1
54
All of the Baltic schemes recognize natural, substitutional,
and financial restitution 155 and favor returning property to the
former owners via natural restitution.156 If this is not possible,
then the Baltic schemes attempt to redeem former owners via
substitutional restitution. Under circumstances where natural or
substitutional restitution is unavailable, the Baltic schemes
provide compensation (i.e., financial restitution). 157  One
mechanism of restitution compensates former owners in the form
of lump-sum payments equal to the property's value at the time it
was expropriated. 158 Another mechanism compensates former
owners by issuing government securities "similar in value" to their
confiscated assets, shares in a compensation fund, or stock in
of Estonia on the Principles of Property Reform art. 19 (June 13, 1991) (Est.)).
147. See id. at 639.
148. See id. at 639 & nn.97-98, 628 n.23 (citing the Republic of Latvia Law on the
Denationalization of Buildings in the Republic of Latvia art. 2 (Oct. 30, 1991) (Lat.)).
149. See id.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. See id. at 640.
155. See generally id. at 633-635 (discussing the spectrum of restitution forms the three
Baltic states offer: natural restitution; substitutional restitution; and compensation, the two
types of which are financial and voucher restitution).
156. See id. at 633-637.
157. See id. at 635.
158. See id. at 636.
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newly privatized enterprises, housing, or land parcels. 159
Restitution schemes should also establish claimant eligibility
requirements. For example, the Estonian system defines eligible
restitution claimants as individuals who were citizens at the time
the takings occurred or are current citizens or their heirs.160
Foreign citizens within any of these categories are also eligible for
compensation. 161 Estonia also includes government, religious, and
nonprofit organizations in the category of eligible claimants. 162
Foreign states, legal entities, and foreign nationals must use a
different restitution system 163 by resolving their claims through
mutual agreements with Estonia and their respective states.164
The Lithuanian scheme does not allow a former owner to
reoccupy his or her former home unless the current tenant finds
alternate living space.165 The title of the property, however,
returns to the former owners who may then charge rent for
occupancy. 166 The Lithuanian laws also limit the size of farmland
a former owner reclaims and may impose land use
requirements. 167 If the former owner does not comply, the land is
re-distributed to other claimants. 168 Under the Latvian scheme,
unclaimed land is auctioned off to the highest bidder. 169
Estonia's restitution law applies to housing, farmland,
securities, machinery, and valuables. 170 The Latvian laws apply
only to housing and farmland because it is too difficult to trace
other categories of property in a cost-effective manner.171
Lithuania's system is similar to Latvia's except that it defines
"property" as land, timber, housing, and "economic or
commercial" buildings.172
The typical Baltic restitution scheme requires that claimants
file their claims before specific deadlines. Estonia's laws allow
159. See id.
160. See id. at 629.
161. See id.
162. See id. at 629-630.
163. See id.
164. See id. at 630.
165. See Gutidrrez, supra note 89, at 116.
166. See id.
167. See id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 117.
170. See id. at 116.
171. See id. at 116-117.
172. See id. at 117.
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claimants to file supporting documentation after the initial
filing.173  All of the Baltic schemes require documentation
supporting the claims, such as wills, deeds, or other confirming
ownership documents. 174  Evidence may also include the
description, dimensions, location, and estimated value of the
property. 175 An eligible heir must prove his or her relationship to
the original owner by providing marriage or birth certificates.
176
B. Germany
In post-unification Germany, the basis for statutory
guidelines regarding property restitution and compensation claims
is the Joint Declaration of the Governments of the Federal
Republic of Germany and the Former Democratic Republic,
which has been incorporated into the Unification Treaty.177 The
Treuhandanstalt is the public agency responsible for resolving
property claims.
178
The German scheme provides for restitution and
compensation. 179 Former property owners may relinquish their
claims for restitution and instead opt for compensation.180 The
German property legislative scheme offers no guidance for
computing compensation or finding the source of such
compensation funds. 181 When property is returned, the former
owner may have to pay for any improvements to the property that
increased its value. 182 Accordingly, if the value of the property
decreased as a result of the confiscation, the former owner is
compensated for the decrease.
In certain instances, former property owners may be
completely barred from obtaining natural restitution. 183  For
example, if a church or non-profit organization purchased
property from the state in good faith, the former owner is limited
173. See id.
174. See Foster, supra note 102, at 638.
175. See id.
176. See id. at 638-639.
177. See Guti~rrez, supra note 89, at 125-126.
178. See id. at 129.
179. See id. at 125-130.
180. See id. at 127.
181. See id. at 128.
182. See id.
183. See id.
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to compensation. 184 Mere knowledge that the state confiscated
the property does not constitute a lack of good faith on the part of
a third-party purchaser. 185 Furthermore, claimants are limited to
compensation only in those cases where property "has been
materially altered, dedicated to common use (such as for streets or
'complex housing'), or inextricably incorporated into a public
enterprise.'
'186
German law offers compensation only when the government
needed the confiscated property to create jobs, satisfy housing
demands, or develop infrastructure required to create such jobs or
housing. 187 The Treuhandanstalt is authorized to auction property
to former West German or foreign investors in the interest of
offsetting East Germany's economic problems, such as high
unemployment and housing shortages.188  The present or
prospective owner must present a special investment purpose to
the Treuhandanstalt in order to keep or acquire the property.189
German courts possess authority to review the special investment
proposal. 190 If the property has a special investment purpose, the
former owner is entitled to compensation. 191
The German scheme does not allow for the privatization of
state property if a claim is filed before the required deadline, and
concessions are made to former owners if the deadline was
missed. 192  To encourage risk-free investment in property,
prospective investors and the Treuhandanstalt must determine
whether claims on such property exist prior to privatization.
One of the greatest obstacles confronting the German model
is the unavailability of technical records proving ownership. 193
Allied bombing during World War II and destruction of property
records by the Nazis and the communists have left little, if any,
evidence of ownership. 194
184. See id.
185. See id.
186. Id.
187. See id. at 129.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id.
192. See id. at 129-130.
193. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 185.
194. See Guti~rrez, supra note 89, at 128.
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C. Hungary
The Hungarian Parliament passed the Law on Partial
Compensation for Damages Unlawfully Caused by the State to
Properties Owned by Citizens in the Interest of Settling Relations
to serve as a legal basis for expropriation claims.195  The
Hungarian restitution scheme does not return property to former
owners. 196 .It does, however, provide compensation to former
owners in the form of interest-bearing certificates, which may be
used to purchase state-owned property, business, or shares in
businesses that national and local governments offer for sale.
197
These interest-bearing certificates may be sold to Hungarian
citizens or foreigners.198 Former owners have priority, but not the
exclusive right, to repurchase their property with cash or
certificates. 199  Foreign citizens and residents can obtain
compensation if they were Hungarian citizens at the time the
takings occurred.
200
D. The Czech Republic and Slovakia
The Czech Republic and Slovakia's restitution scheme is one
of the most generous of the Eastern European schemes. 201 These
two countries, formerly united as Czechoslovakia, enacted
different laws governing claims for different types of property.
20 2
The First Restitution Act (Act 1)203 provides for the return of
properties, confiscated between 1955 and 1959, to the original
owners and their successors. 204 The property in Act I primarily
consists of small individually owned businesses.20 5 The Act offers
195. See id. at 130-131 (citing Law XXV of 1991 on Partial Compensation for Damages
Unlawfully Caused by the State to Properties Owned by Citizens in the Interest of Setting
Ownership Relations (Hung.), translated in 2 HUNGARIAN RULES OF LAW IN FORCE
(1996), available in LEXIS, Hungary Library, Legislation & Regulations File).
196. See id. at 131.
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. See id.
200. See Travieso-Diaz, supra note 108, at 248.
201. See Gutidrrez, supra note 89, at 121.
202. See id. at 121-125.
203. Law on the Mitigation of the Consequences of Certain Property Losses, No.
403/1990 Coll. of Laws (Oct. 2, 1990) (Czech., Slovak.), translated in [Binder 2
Czechoslovakia] Cent. & E. Eur. Legal Materials (Parker Sch. Foreign & Comp. L.) 3
(Vratislav Pechota ed., 1998).
204. See Guti6rrez, supra note 89, at 122.
205. See id.
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compensation instead of restitution when the property has been
destroyed, irrevocably altered, or improved through use.206
Under Act I, third parties who invested in confiscated property
must enter into contracts with claimants to recover their
investments. 207
The Second Restitution Act (Act 11)208 addresses properties
taken between 1948 and 1989, with a total aggregate value in
excess of $10.7 billion.20 9 Under Act II, only resident citizens of
the Czech Republic are entitled to compensation;210 companies
and other legal entities are specifically excluded.211  Czechs and
Slovaks residing abroad 212 and foreign nationals also are not
entitled to restitution.213 Act II requires that the current owners
of confiscated property return the property deeds to the original
owners.214 Any disputes arising are submitted to the courts.215 If
natural restitution is impossible, original owners are compensated
in cash and government-issued bonds.2
16
Before the state privatizes property in the Czech Republic or
Slovakia, it examines the records of the registry deeds to
determine whether a private owner was listed prior to 1948.217 If
there is an eligible previous owner, the privatization is delayed
until six months after the applicable Restitution Act's effective
date.218 Thus, privatization only occurs if no valid claim is filed
during that six-month period.21
9
206. See id. at 122-123.
207. See id. at 123.
208. Law on Extrajudicial Rehabilitation, Law No. 47/1991 Coll. of Laws (Feb. 21,
1991) (Czech., Slovak.), translated in [Binder 2 Czechoslovakia] Cent. & E. Eur. Legal
Materials (Parker Sch. Foreign & Comp. L.), supra note 203, at 1.
209. See Guti~rrez, supra note 89, at 123.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id. at 124.
213. See id.
214. See id. at 123.
215. See id. at 123-124.
216. See id. at 124.
217. See id.
218. See id.
219. See id.
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E. Bulgaria
Bulgaria's attempt to create a democracy involves legal and
economic reforms, a new constitution, and normalization of
Bulgaria's relations with the United States. 220 The Bulgarian
Parliament implemented the Law on Ownership and Use of
Agricultural Land 221 for purposes of returning confiscated land to
former owners and their heirs.222 The law limits land ownership
to twenty hectares (49.4 acres) in areas of intense cultivation and
thirty hectares (about 74 acres) in hilly or mountainous regions.
223
The Law on Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land entitles
former owners to natural or substitutional restitution. 224 With
substitutional restitution, former owners receive land of equal size
and quality to the land taken from them.225 Former owners must
use the new land for agricultural purposes-they may lease the
land to third parties,226 but the same land use restrictions apply to
the leases.227 Both sale of the land during the first three years
after substitution and foreign ownership are prohibited.
228
F. Poland
The Polish Government is still creating restitution laws to
address communist takings.229 Poland's restitution scheme seems
to favor privatization as the central means of raising funds to
satisfy property claims. 230  Through privatization, most large
properties will be sold to private enterprises; thus, the original
owners only receive compensation for lost properties. 231 The
Polish privatization scheme will raise funds primarily via selling
220. See id. at 118-119.
221. Law on Ownership and Use of Agricultural Land (Feb. 22, 1991) (Bulg.),
translated in [Binder 1A Bulgaria] Cent. & E. Eur. Legal Materials (Parker Sch. Foreign &
Comp. L.) 3 (Vratislav Pechota ed., 1999).
222. See Guti6rrez, supra note 89, at 119.
223. See id.
224. See id. at 118-120.
225. See id. at 119.
226. See id.
227. See id.
228. See id.
229. See Beata Pasek, East European Nations Swamped by Post-Communist Restitution
Claims Economics, L.A. TIMEs, Apr. 18, 1999, at A4.
230. See id.
231. See id.
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"some [seventy] companies by public tender or initial public
offerings." 232 Former owners, whose property is legally acquired
through privatizing state assets, will receive vouchers equivalent to
the value of their property.233 These vouchers can be used to
purchase shares in state-owned companies undergoing
privatization.234  The Polish scheme also guarantees former
owners priority in buying back their old property. 235
Approximately nine billion dollars worth of state property is
currently allocated for vouchers. 236 Before privatization occurs,
investigation into properties' past ownership is required. 237
Property not subject to privatization will be returned to
former owners. According to the Treasury Ministry, the Polish
Government plans to return about twenty billion dollars worth of
property held by state or local authorities to its former owners.238
Some property is exempt from privatization, including chemists'
shops, forests, and other property "that can be separated from
existing state, municipal, or cooperative property currently in
use." 23
9
Eligible claimants include individuals of Polish nationality
and residents who can prove they are descendents of the
confiscated properties' original owners. 240 Polish claimants living
abroad are eligible for restitution or compensation provided they
return to Poland permanently and administer the enterprises
and/or farm the lands.241
Although the Polish system allows for restitution and
compensation, its main priority seems to be privatizing large
industries to promote foreign and domestic investment in the
Polish industrial sector.242  According to Polish Government
officials, Poland's poor economic situation precludes it from
232. Polish Government Approves 1999 Privatization Plan, Dow JONES INT'L NEWS,
Oct. 27, 1998, available in Westlaw, 10/27/98 DJINS 12:22:00.
233. See Pasek, supra note 229, at A4 (noting that the government, through a voucher
system, plans to return to former owners property still held by the state or local
authorities).
234. See id.
235. See id.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. Guti6rrez, supra note 89, at 135.
240. See id. at 136.
241. See id.
242. See id. at 139.
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satisfying all property claims.243 Therefore, eliminating Poland's
economic crisis through privatization is really its best alternative
to provide effective restitution to the former owners of
expropriated property.
244
VII. CONCLUSION
Implementing new Cuban political and legal systems is an
absolute requirement if a post-socialist Cuba is to become a free-
market democracy. Drafting a new constitution with property
laws based on the Constitution of 1940 and internationally
accepted legal principles will legitimize a new Cuban government
in the international community's eyes. Implementation of a
restitution scheme will demonstrate Cuba's commitment to
upholding fundamental notions of fairness, freedom, and
democracy, while encouraging foreign investment.
Considering Cuba's economic conditions, executing a
restitution scheme will undoubtedly be a difficult task. A post-
socialist Cuba should learn from the failures and successes of
other European restitution schemes. In creating their own
scheme, Cuban legislators must give careful consideration to the
island's social and economic conditions-key factors affecting
Cuba's transition to democracy. Certain aspects of the restitution
scheme must be flexible to accommodate such conditions.
Cuban lawmakers should begin by emulating Bulgaria's
policy and implementing new social and economic reforms and a
new constitution. Similar to the Lithuanian scheme, the Cuban
scheme should create different agencies, ministries, or committees
to handle different types of properties. As in most restitution
schemes, the Cuban scheme should establish and enforce strict
deadlines.
Cuban exiles should be treated as Cuban citizens for
expropriation claim purposes, provided they were citizens at the
time the takings occurred. Foreign nationals, companies, and
heirs of eligible claimants should also be eligible to file claims.
Third-party investors should not be allowed to file claims for
properties until original owners' claims are satisfied. Any Cuban
scheme should consider the Czech Republic and Slovakian
schemes allowing third-party investors to enter into contracts with
243. See Pasek, supra note 229, at A4.
244. See id.
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original owners to recover their investments. 245
The Cuban scheme should also establish a separate system
and agency for foreign claims. Because most foreign claims will
come from the United States, the two governments should reach a
settlement regarding specific laws and procedures governing
resolution of such claims. Furthermore, like the Baltic scheme, a
Cuban restitution scheme should allow for natural, substitutional,
and financial restitution and require that eligible claimants choose
either physical or financial restitution, thereby limiting the
government's liability. Special funds should be created to satisfy
claims of claimants eligible for compensation and unclaimed
property should be auctioned to the highest bidders and the
proceeds used to satisfy claims. If cash is unavailable, claimants
could be paid with government securities or vouchers.
Perhaps the major industries in Cuba such as sugar, coffee,
and cigars should be privatized or re-privatized to raise money for
funding claim settlement. Placing these industries in the hands of
wealthy, private companies may prove beneficial to the Cuban
economy. Stock in the newly privatized industries could also
constitute compensation. The original owners should receive
rights of first refusal, however, before privatization occurs.
Property claims should be limited to homes, businesses, and
land-allowing claimants to file claims for other types of property
is too costly and time consuming. Also, restrictions should be
placed on certain reclaimed properties. For example, current
residents should not be removed from their homes-claimants
attempting to regain their now-occupied homes should only
receive monetary compensation.
The Cuban scheme should utilize a flexible evidentiary
standard for establishing ownership. That is not to say that the
evidentiary standard should be relaxed. Because Cuba will face
problems similar to Germany's, in that records of ownership have
been destroyed or lost,24 6 the Cuban scheme should follow the
Baltic schemes, which allow for consideration of a wide array of
evidence, including witness testimony, in determining ownership.
In conclusion, the Cuban restitution scheme should be
implemented as quickly as possible after the fall of communism.
The prompt return of and fair compensation and restitution for
245. See Guti6rrez, supra note 89, at 123.
246. See Alexander & Mills, supra note 1, at 186.
[Vol. 22:321
2000] Takings and Restitution Schemes in Post-Socialist Cuba 355
expropriated property will redevelop the Cuban economy and
facilitate its transition to democracy.

